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I.Introduction
The empirical implementation of theoretical contributions in the social
sciences usually rests on variables defined and measured by persons other
than the theorist. Such is the case with the theory of marriage. For the
United States, the only relevant demographic quantity measured with
accuracy is two-person, male-female legal marriage. Thus, my decision to
study legal marriage was imposed by the Bureau of the Census and the
inherent difficulties of measuring other forms of communal living. This
does not seem to be restrictive for the United States, where consensual
marriage is often a prelude to legal marriage, but it may be important in
countries such as those in Latin America, where legal and other social
institutions (i.e., divorce laws) differ.t
That a model of marriage based on rational choice has substantial
explanatory power is demonstrated in this study. Three factors—the ratio
of the sexes, the potential returns to marriage, and the cost of divorce—
explain many of the areal differences in marital behavior in the United
States. It is also evident that the marriage market has important indirect
effects on the reproduction rate.
II.The Marriage Market
People decide to marry when they expect to enjoy some flow of "real"
income, denoted by Z,whichis greater than that which they could receive
I thank Gary Becker, H. Gregg Lewis, Marc Nerlove, Margaret Reid, T. W. Schultz,
and T. Dudley Wallace for their many helpfIsl suggestions, not all of which have been
incorporated in this paper. I, of course, am solely responsible for any errors. The work
for this paper was financed in part by grants to the University of Chicago from the Nat-
ional Institutes of Mental Health and the Rockefeller Foundation.
'For an analysis of the three forms of marriage recognired in Brazil, see Kogut (1972).
Cheung (1972) has described the structure of property rights within marriage in China.
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if single.2 The Zrepresentsan abstract commodity, produced within
households, which is the true source of personal satisfaction. Let
= +
represent the yield to marriage, where the right-hand side is the distri-
bution of this "real" income between the married partners. With Zmf
takenas given, this distribution of married real income is determined by
the supply of husbands and wives to the marriage market. The qualitative
results derived holding Zm1constantare not altered when couples are
sorted in a manner which optimizes the total output of Zwithinthe
community.
If unmarried, the ith male would obtain the real income Zmjandthe





Since no male will accept less than his single income, the first male
desiring marriage will be forthcoming at some level of married income,
which is equal to the minimum single income, Zmi,takenover all
males. By ordering males with respect to their single incomes, the supply
curve of males in the marriage market is equivalent to the cumulative
distribution of males with respect to the Zm,. In figure 1, this distribution
has been drawn as if the maximum single income were undefined, that is,
the supply curve asymptotically approaches the boundary set by the total
number of males (which initially equals the number of females). The
qualitative results derived here do not depend on this particular distri-
bution. Similarly, the supply curve of females is the cumulative distri-
bution of the Zf1. Now, since
the supply of females is a negatively inclined function of the male marital
income, and can be viewed as the derived demand for husbands by
females.4 No women can be found who would offer more than Zmf less
the minimum offor a husband, so the supply-of-potential-wives curve
begins at
Zmf— (mm)
and falls to the right.
2This section is based on Part I of Becker's paper in this volume. For another applica-
tion of the general model see Keeley (1974).
The superscript mf denotes a married couple. The subscripts m and f refer to single
males and females.
'The analysis is, of course, perfectly symmetrical for the derived demand for wives by
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males.The intersection, e, of the supply curves in figure 1 gives the number of
men and women marrying as well as the distribution of income within
marriage. The proportion of females married will be NT/N1, and their
real income will be Z'"f = Ztm' —
Now, consider an increase in the number of men to This will shift
the equilibrium to e', raising the real income of married women to
= —z"j'> z'"/ =zmf—
Thisincrease is not directly observable, but the coincident increase in
the number of females married, from to N"i, will raise the proportion
of women married to
N"tN"1
N,. N1
Thus, the model predici
positively related to the
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Fio. 1.—The marriage marketT
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I Thus,the model predicts that the proportion of women married should be
positively related to the ratio of men to women.
To derive further implications, the nature of the household production
process generating Zmf (and the single real incomes) must be made
I explicit.Let
1 Z =g(X, Tm, T1)
I
representthe household production function for the flows of real income
previously denoted by Zm1, Zm, and Z1. The X represents goods and ser-
vices purchased in the market, Tm is male time, and T1, female time. The
g is then the household production function which summarizes the
I technologyavailable for converting market goods and time into the actual
I sourceof utility, namely, Z. As increasing returns to scale would always
I resultin a gain to marriage regardless of the number or sex of the
I participants,g will be a function such that economies of scale are ruled
I
out.5
I Asingle male would maximize his production of Z subject to the con-
I
straintthat T1 = 0, that is, Max Z = g(X, Tm, T1), subject to (1)
I
Tm+ Lm = T, Lm = market work; (2) PX = WmLm + Vm, P = index
of prices, Wm = wage rate, Vm = nonmarket income; and (3) T, = 0.
The maximized value of Z is Zm. Similarly, a single female would
Max Z = g(X, Tm, T1),subjectto(1)T1 + L1 = T;(2) PX =
W1L1 + V1; and (3) Tm =0.The maximized value of Z is Z1. In
either case, one person must substitute his own time to make up for the
N = NUMBERS absenceof theother's. A marriedcouple would maximize Z without the
third constraint: Max Z = g(X, Tm, T1), subject to (1) Tm + Lm = T,
T1 + L, = T; and (2) PX =WmLm+ W1L1 + Vm + V1. The max-
imized value of Z is Zmj. The gain to marriage is then
C= Z"1 — (Zm + Z1).
1gives the number of
tion of income within A more convenient form of this expression is obtained as follows. If be N7/N1, and their Z = g(X, Tm, T1), where g is a function of factor inputs, then there exists
a function c = c(P, Wm, W1), a function of factor prices, which gives the i to This will shift minimum average coit of producing units of Z in the household (this is srried women to
the cost dual of the household production function). For married couples
this function is c"1(P, Wm, W1); for single males it is Cm(P,Wm);and so
on. The maximized value of Z is then total resources available divided by
this average cost of production. Resources available, called full income, coincident increase in can be obtained by combining the time and goods constraints. For a 'ill raise the proportion married couple these constraints are (1) Tm + Lm = T, T1 + L1 =
and (2) PX = WmLm + W1L1 + Vm + VI.
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Lm = T —TmandL1 = T —T1,
then
PX= Tm) + W1(T— T1) + Vm+ V1, or
PX + Wm Tm + W1T1 = (Wm + W1) T ++ V1.
The left-hand side is the total monetary equivalent of time and market-
goods expenditures, while the right-hand side is full income. Thus,
G =(Wm + Wf) T + Vm + — T + Vm+W1T +
Cmf(p, Wm, W1) LCm(P,Wm) c,.(P, W1)
By totally differentiating G, further implications of the model may be
derived. 6
First, consider the wage rates. If
Wm = WI,
MP == MP = and
m f
Vm = V1,then
Zm + Z1 = 2Z = Zmf.
This means that if male and female time are perfect substitutes in both
household and market production, there is no gain from marriage.
However, in all other cases ZmI will exceed the combined single incomes.
Note that the marginal products must be equal throughout the range of
inputs and not just at a point. In particular, the combined gain would be
greater the larger the difference between Wm and W1. If, as is usually the
case, Wm > Wf, then the husband will specialize in market production
while the wife concentrates her time in the home. Therefore, the gains
from marriage and the proportion of females married should be positively
related to the relative wage rate, WmI W1. However, the effect of equal
proportionate increases in the male and female wage rates is ambiguous.
On the one hand, there is a positive income effect associated with the rise
in full income. But on the other hand, there is a negative cost-of-produc-
tion effect due to the elasticity of the cost dual of the household production
function with respect to the wage rates. If this elasticity is sufficiently large
(in absolute value), the net effect of equiproportionate increases in male
and female wages may be negative. Note that equal percentage increases
in the nonlabor incomes TTm and V, do not generate a negative cost-of-
production effect, so the gains to marriage are expected to rise with such
a change.
6Thisapproach is equivalent to a comparative statics analysis of the market-supply
curves, since an increase in the gain to marriage shifts both curves to the right in figure 1.T- T1,
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The manner in which education affects the household production
function is not obvious, so the prediction of this factor's effects on the
gains to marriage is unclear. For example, consider the following two
ways of looking at education: first as factor-neutral technological change
and then as factor-augmenting. In the first case, education uniformly
reduces the amount of each input required to produce units of Z, that is,
zml
—(Wm+ W,) T + Vm + V1and so on
Am(Em)Ai(Ei)(F, Wm, W1)
where E stands for education and the A's are functions whose first
derivatives are negative. It can be shown that the gain to marriage is
positively related to increases in education in this case. If treated as factor-
augmenting technical change, education improves the efficiency of the
time input independently, that is,
(W,.d,+ W1) T + Vm + Vf
ZMfrpp!s'\w P(P\TA/1'
L' ml fifJ
whereBm and B1 are functions similar to the A's. Special conditions must
hold to obtain the same results as above. If education raises the non-
market productivity relative to the market productivity of the mate
specializing in household production, or the relative market productivity
of the market specialist, then it increases the gains to marriage. However,
either of these possibilities may prove difficult or impossible to distinguish
empirically.
Until this point, an implicit assumption was made that perfect in-
formation and certainty held for persons in the marriage market. Clearly,
this is not the case. The high divorce rate of persons married 2 years or
less is evidence that uncertainty plays an important role. This divorce
behavior may be interpreted as the correction of mistakes. Then a
lowering of the cost of correcting a mistake (the difficulty of divorce)
should induce people to marry more readily. The effect of the cost of
divorce on the stock of marriages, however, is uncertain since a fall in the
cost of divorce also encourages the dissolution of existing marriages. The
former is likely to dominate the behavior of the young, while the latter is
more relevant for older couples.
111Empirical Implementation
Three sets of data—state, county, and Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA) aggregates—are used to evaluate the model's predictions.
Since no single set of data is completely satisfactory, this test rests on
evidence accumulated from several sources. The most complete data are




among the observations is increased by using a random sample of United
States counties, but the federal census compilations are insufficiently
detailed, especially with regard to age-specific and female wage data.
The method used is to estimate an ordinary least-squares regression
with a measure of the proportion of females married (FEMMAR) as a
dependent variable and the relative wage (RELWG), the ratio of the
sexes (SXRT), the cost of divorce (DCOST), and a measure of income as
independent variables.7 All observations are weighted by the appropriate
number of females. For the states and SMSAs, equations are estimated for
each of the 5-year age cohorts between ages 15 and 39. The actual vari-
ables used are described below and listed in table 1.
1. FEMMAR. The proportion of females married is the number of
women married, with spouse present, divided by the total number of
women. There is a small error due to the exclusion of married women
having a spouse absent for reasons other than separation, but this is
insignificant. More important, however, is the treatment of widows. On
the average, males die earlier than females (especially married males), so
there will be some widows who should be considered "involuntarily"
single. Investigating a revised figure for females married, one that in-
cluded widows, showed little difference in the results, so this factor is
ignored.
2. RELWG. Three alternative measures of male and female wage rates
are available. The best is the annual earnings of full-time wage and salary
workers as estimated by the Social Security Administration. These
figures represent the marginal (and here average) opportunity cost of
time to a prospective labor-market participant. It is likely that these values
approximate the permanent wage rates for workers by state. The relative
wage is simply male earnings divided by female earnings. The mnemonic
for the Social Security wage is RELWGSS. A second measure of the full-
time wage is the United States Census figure for median earnings of
persons working 50—52 weeks in the previous years. Since this is available
for both states and SMSAs, direct comparisons between the results are
feasible. The symbol for a measure of the male-female relative wage based
on census data is RELWGCN. Finally, it is most unfortunate that neither
of these measures is compiled at the county level. The only sex-specific
earnings data are the median annual earnings of persons. This value is
quite sensitive to labor-force participation rates, so it is a biased measure
for the purpose of explaining marriage. Suppose the full-time relative
wage is high, then the gains to marriage are highest with husbands
7 Education could not be investigated at thistime.In aggregatedata, the relationship
between income and education is very close, so multicollinearity is a severe problem.
The 1970 Public Use Samples of Basic Records from the Bureau of the Census were
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where NF(k) is the number of females inthe kth age group.


































FEMMAR* Proportion of females married,
spouse present
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1962; l963b,tables59 and
105)
RELWGCN ....Male/female relative wage, per-
Sons working 50—52 weeks in
1959
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1963b, table 134)
RELWGSS Male/female relative wage, full-U.S. Department of Health,
RELWGAE
time annual earnings
Male/female relative median an-
Education,andWelfare
(1968b,tableV-17)
U.S. Bureau of the Census
SXRT*
nual earnings
Sex ratio, number of males/num-
ben of females
(1963b tables 134 and 136)







Index of ease of divorce
Proportion of population Catholic
Median value of owner-occupied
housing
Median gross monthly rental
Births per 1,000 women
Table 2 (below)
National Council of Churches
(1956, table 4)
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1962; 1963b, table 20)
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1962; 1963a)










U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1962; 1963b, tables 82 and
128)
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1962)




Median school years completed,
females, 25 years and older
Median school years completed,
(l963b, tables 86 and 136)
U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1963b, table 83)
U.S. Bureauof the Census
AGE
males, 25 years and older










specializing in market labor and wives in household production. This
implies a lower female labor-force participation rate and lower median
annual female earnings. Therefore, if the model is correct, the observed
annual earnings of females will be negatively correlated with the pro-
portion of females married. With this caveat, a relative wage based on
annual earnings (RELWGAE) is used for the counties.
The preceding analysis brings to light an interesting question about the
interpretation of observed wage differentials and also their relation to
education. If formal schooling primarily acts to raise market-earning
potential, then the measured effects of education, holding the market wage
Constant, must be picking up something else, that is, on-the-job training.
Suppose husbands and wives specialize as predicted. For a time men are
receiving on-the-job training which raises their market age-earnings
profile above that which would hold in the absence of such training. At
the same time, their wives would experience depreciation of their stocks
of market-specific human capital (but an increase in the nonmarket
component) which lowers their permanent market wage. Therefore, even
the full-time wage is somewhat biased as a predictor of marital behavior.8
It is true that a "pseudo wage" estimated from the demand side of the
market would be more appropriate, but this approach will not be followed
at present.
3. SXRT. The ratio of the sexes is simply the number of males in each
age group divided by the number of females. For the counties it is the
number of males 15 years and older divided by the equivalent number of
females. A minor concern with this definition is that males tend to marry
females a few years younger than themselves. Redefining the sex ratio to
take account of this does not affect the results appreciably.
4. DCOST. The measure of the cost of divorce is not a quantitative
variable. It is an index of the ease of divorce legislation as compiled
through questionnaires and other data in However, an attempt
was made to achieve cardinality, so the actual values used are probably
at least highly correlated with the true values. Note that it is an index of
the ease or permissiveness of the law and represents the inverse of the cost
of divorce. Table 2 lists the values used. Religion may also be a relevant
psychic cost of divorce for Catholic couples, so a set of regressions in-
cluding the percentage of the population Catholic (CATH) in place of
DCOST is estimated for the states.
5. INCOME. The appropriate income measure is full family income,
including labor and nonlabor components. The census value, median
family income, is subject to the same measurement problems mentioned
above for the female wage and is, therefore, unacceptable. An alternative,
8This maybe added to Gronau's list of applications (1972) in which observed female
wages are biased predictors of behavior.
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Florida 90 Ohio 48
Arkansas 85 North Dakota 46
Idaho 81 Delaware 45

































































Texas 50 New York 4
Iowa 49 South Carolina 1
Sougcs.—Broel-Plateris 1961 •table12, p.149.
on the expenditure rather than the receipt side of family accounts, has
been suggested (Margaret Reid 1962). This is the median value of
owner-occupied housing (HSEVAL). Since a large proportion of urban
dwelling units are not occupied by owners, the median monthly gross
rental (RENT) will also be used for the SMSAs. There are two reasons
for using these measures. First, the observed positive income elasticity of
demand for housing guarantees that a family's housing expenditure is
positively correlated with income so HSEVAL and RENT will be
unbiased surrogate measures. Second, these expenditures are not sensitive
to the transitory component of income.'0
IV.Results
There is a problem interpreting the regression results reported below. The
FEMMAR is a limited dependent variable, that is, a proportion bounded
by zero and one (0—100 in percentages). This complicates the evaluation
of elasticities but not the estimation technique, since no estimated values
Theremay be a bias due to a price component.362 ALAN FREIDEN
of the dependent variable violated these boundary constraintsCon-
sider a given percentage change in a bounded variable. If the variable is
already near its upper bound, then a small change is also a large change
relative to the distance to the upper bound. For example, suppose
FEMMAR is 90. A 1 percent increase to 90.9 is the same as a 9 percent
decrease in the distance between the initial value and the upper bound.
Therefore, elasticities for the older age groups, those with an average
proportion of married women greater than 80 percent, should be inter-
preted with this in mind.
Tables 3 and 4 are the ordinary least-squares results from the state and
SMSA data, respectively. Two alternative measures of relative wages
are shown for the states and two of income for the SMSAs. Results for
one set of equations from each data source are summarized in elasticity
form in table 5. The explanatory power of the four independent variables
is quite good, with R2 > .5 in all but one case and with the vector of
estimated coefficients significantly different from zero at the 5 percent
level of confidence in every case. However, there are a number of para-
meter estimates with large standard errors; this is not unusual, given the
level of aggregation employed here. Two approaches to this problem will
be described later.
The data support the hypothesis that the proportion of females married
is positively related to the ratio of the sexes. Only one coefficient is not
significantly greater than zero at the 5 percent level.12 Evidence on the
effect of the cost of divorce is that the incidence of marriage rises as
divorce becomes easier. Table 6 contains the regression results for a
replication of one set of the state equations using the proportion of the
population Catholic (CATH) in place of DCOST. Here a negative sign
on CATH is equivalent to a positive one on DCOST, so the coefficients
(all significant) arc consistent with theory.'3 Note that for all five sets of
regressions (state, SMSA, and state with CATH) the elasticity of marriage
with respect to the cost of divorce declines monotonically with age. The
decline is greater than that which is generated by the effect discussed at
the beginning of this section. This indicates that of the two effects
mentioned earlier, encouraging new marriages and lowering the cost of
dissolving existing ones, the former is more relevant for young couples.
The influence of income is puzzling. Where significant, the coefficients of
both RENT and HSEVAL are negative. This contradicts Silver's finding
(1965) that the flow of new marriages (i.e., the marriage rate) conforms
to the business cycle. Of course, if the income elasticity of the divorce
Elsewhere I have used the logit transformation in this context (1972).
12Ofcourse, one coefficient out of 20 will randomly fail the 5 percent t-test when the
null hypothesis is true.
Multicollinearity prohibits including CATH along with DCOST and HSEVAL in
the same equation.ALAN FREIDEN
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VARIABLES 15—19 20—24 25—29 30—34 35—39
State Data
RELWGCN ... ... ... ... ...
RELWGSS —0.33 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.08
SXRT 1.48 0.20 0.52 0.70 0.73
DCOST 0.28 0.09 0.013 0.008 0.005
HSEVAL —0.38 —0.09 —0.11 —0.08 —0.04
RENT ... ... ... ... ...
SMSA Data
RELWGCN —0.005 0.24 0.22 0.09 0.05
RELWGSS ... ... ... ... ...
SXRT 0.63 0.15 0.33 0.38 0.59
DCOST 0.41 0.12 0.05 0.012 —0.007
USEVAL ... ... ... ... ...
RENT —0.64 0.01 —0.03 —0.06 —0.05
TABLE 6
REGRESSION OF FEMMAR, 1960 STATE DATA
AGE
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE 15—19 20—24 25—29 30—34 35—39
RELWGSS 6.90 19.0 9.59 4.34 3.82
(2.36) (4.67) (3.94)





























F(4, 43) 25.3 18.7 17.8 26.3 29.9
in parenlheses.
rate exceeds that of the marriage rate, then the cross-sectional and time-
series results are consistent.
A strong theoretical result is that the potential gain to marriage and,
therefore, the proportion of women married, is positively related to the
sex-specific relative wage. This is confirmed for persons age 25 and older
but not for the young. Suppose that the benefits to marriage as perceived
by teenagers differ from those of adults. Then the gains to specialization
may not be relevant although other market factors (sex ratio and cost ofJ..
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divorce) are. If so, then as these people mature, many of the "irrational"
marriages will dissolve, leaving in the stock of married persons only those
enjoying gains to specialization. While ad hoc, this argument is plausible
given the substantially higher divorce rate among couples married as
teenagers.Also, suppose the costs of marriage for teenagers differ from
those for adults. This is obviously the case, since the age of consent is 21
for males and 18 for females in most states. Then a measure of the cost of
marriage as well as of the cost of divorce is necessary in the regressions
for the group of persons ages 15—19. Unfortunately, no such measure is
readily available, but the states with a substantial Catholic population
seem to have the strictest marriage laws.'' If the results for persons ages
15—19 in table 6 are interpreted with CATH viewed as a measure both of
the cost of divorce and the cost of marriage, the relative wage effect is
substantiated.
The evidence presented so far would have been more convincing had
the estimates been more accurate. Imprecise parameters may be improved
through the application of additional sample information. Here two
techniques are employed to make better use of the data available. First,
it is obvious that the division of the population into 5-year age cohorts is
arbitrary. Therefore, one would expect the behavior of adjacent age
groups to be similar. For the regression model used here, the correlations
of the residuals of adjacent age groups is very high. There is information
in the set of residual correlations which can be used to obtain more
efficient estimates of the coefficients of all five equations through the
seemingly unrelated regressions technique (Zeilner 1962). The results for
the state data (table 7) are as expected. The standard errors of the
coefficient estimates are improved, especially those for DCOST. Since
there are no qualitative changes in the coefficients, the discussion of the
ordinary least-squares results need not be amended.
A second way to improve the information content of the sample is to
expand the number of observations. Roughly a tenfold increase in sample
size occurs through use of a random sample of 530 United States
counties.'6 Unfortunately, no age-specific marriage data are compiled
by the United States Bureau of the Census at this level, so the analysis
must be restricted to a single equation aggregated over age. To standardize
the age structure of the county populations, an index (AGE) was con-
structed which has the value of FEMMAR if the proportion of women
14 Education must be the next factor to be examined in this area. It is likely that
something related to schooling, such as differential human capital investments or the
more efficient college marriage market, explains this poor result.
15 This is based on the casual observation of age of consent, medical requirements,
and waiting periods by state. Note that the two non-Catholic states with strict divorce
laws—North and South Carolina—seem to have very liberal marriage laws.
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REGRESSION OF FEMMAR (WoMEN,15YEARS AND OLDER),
1960 STATE AND COUNTY DATA
An analysis of SMSA data disaggregated by race is in progress. The county data were
also used for a preliminary analysis of education. In the South, the education of women
has by tradition been oriented toward household production. Then higher female
education with the schooling of males held constant should increase the gains to marriage
in the southern states. The following results were obtained by including median male
and female schooling completed (MALSCH and FEMSCH) in the equation for
FEMMAR. The absolute value of the i-statistic is in parentheses:
FEMMAR = —6.8 + 1.8 RELWGAE + 9.4 SXRT ÷0.04DCOST
(1.11) (4.98) (4.91) (4.81)
—0.62 HSEVAL + 0.09 AGRI —0.11NONWT + 0.74 AGE
(5.69) (5.37) (8.67) (7.73)



































































F 12.66 79.56 ...
(df) (8,39) (7,520) .
in parentheses.
married in the county in each age group was identical to the national
average (see table 1). Counties differ in many other ways which may
influence marital behavior, but only two factors, the importance of
agriculture (AGRI) and the relative size of the nonwhite population
(NONWT), will be included. The regression results for the county data
are in table 8. For comparison, a similar regression for age-aggregated
state data is included. The results are consistent with the predictions of
theory and those reported above. As expected, the parameter estimates
are much more accurate. An interesting finding is that, ceteris paribus,
nonwhites have a lower propensity to marry. Of course, everything is
not being held constant, since what is being measured here is the effect of
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red here is the effect of
0 exist among blacks.'7 The county data offer an opportunity to investiate another proposition
mentioned by Becker. Suppose that a major component of family utility
is the consumption of own child services.'8 Then a direction of causation
running from marriage to fertility may not be appropriate. It is the
demand for children which is most relevant, and observed marital
behavior is partially a derived demand. Table 9 lists two-stage least-
squares estimates from a two-equation model treating births and marriage
simultaneously.19 Here FEMMAR is a function of the birth rate
18 This terminology arose in recent economic research on fertility.
19 The first attempt to deal with simultaneous family decisions empirically was by
Nerlove and Schultz (1970).370 ALAN FREIDEN
(BIRRATE) and vice versa.20 The other explanatory variables in the
birth rate equation are those suggested by the new economic approach to
fertility. Clearly, the proportion of females married and, therefore, factors
influencing the marriage market, contributes significantly to the explan-
ation of observed fertility. On the other hand, there is a small elasticity of
the proportion of females married with respect to the birth rate. This can
be explained in two ways. First, child services may not, in fact, constitute
a dominant portion of couples' consumption bundles. Alternatively, this
small elasticity may be a statistical anomaly caused by comparison of a
change in a stock to a change of a flow. Regressing the rate of new mar- —
riageson the birth rate may prove more satisfactory. These results do, how-
ever, suggest the fruitfulness of the simultaneous analysis of family decisions.
The decision to marry is only one of a set of interrelated family choices
that influence both the observed proportion of women married and the
variables chosen to explain this proportion. In a sense, the marriage
equation is partially a reduced form from a simultaneous system in which
all of the right-hand variables are the result of choices made in the past.
This possibility has already been introduced with regard to the relative
wage effect, and it applies to the other variables as well. The sex ratio,
for instance, is determined by migration decisions. If unmarried females —
decideto leave a region (as is true for a rural population), then a greater 2
proportion of the females remaining are married, not simply because the
sex ratio is higher, but also because unmarried women have left. Much
more complete data are required, however, before the nature of these
reverse causations can be investigated. —
V.Conclusions
Data from the 1960 census yield substantial empirical support for the
economic interpretation of the marriage market. Two factors, the ratio
of the sexes and the cost of divorce, influence observed marital behavior as .—'—
expected.This is also true of the gains to specialization, but the results are
somewhat tenuous for teenagers. The evidence also suggests the tentative
conclusion that long-term economic growth may result in more people
desiring to remain single. Finally, it is shown that the analysis of simul-
taneous family decisions is empirically feasible.






z : : : :
E5
0<
Lnatory variables in the
a' economicapproach to
d and, therefore, factors
to the explan-
is a small elasticity of
the birth rate. This can
not, in fact, constitute
idles. Alternatively, this
ised by comparison of a
ig the rate of new mar-
ry. These results do, how-
alysis of family decisions.
family choices
married and the
a sense, the marriage
aneous system in which
oices made in the past.
regard to the relative
as well. The sex ratio,
If unmarried females
ulation), then a greater
not simply because the
omen have left. Much
re the nature of these
pirical support for the
Two factors, the ratio
ed marital behavior as
tion, but the results are
o suggests the tentative
result in more people
t the analysis of simul-
















empirical work, one ca
measured by the sum of
enough to yield signific
full income. Thus, such i
be the case that less gem








gain from the marriag
income is less than th
versely, when the sour
income is larger than
duction, an equal incre
of marriage, given the
or something similar,
whether data can be fo
of full earnings are ope
Not considering pro
a failure to sort out
that have been found s
left in both the Freid
can say something a
symmetry, little can b
by males or the supp
expedient of assumi
demand for wives co
function less twice t
husbands by women
minus twice the single
cost side there are cos
sex ratios, and costs a
Whether one could c
this way, given the s
For good reason, Beck
or equal to unity leaves
Becker has pointed out,
cases. Our sense of descrip
accept the notion that m
individual household pro






Alan Freiden has been reasonably faithful to the Becker marriage model
in his attempt to estimate the reduced-form equation explaining variation
in the proportion of females married. His observational units are regional
subaggregates in cross-section data. Thus, the Freiden paper represents a
commendable attempt to evaluate the usefulness of the model.
The major problem arising in going to the data is in translating and
measuring full income. Full income is a precise concept in the theory but
is made up of two main components, one of which is ambiguous in its
effect upon marriage. The two components of full income are (1) nonlabor
income, and (2) full labor earnings if both male and female were com-
pletely occupied in the market. Variation in the first component, nonlabor
income, is unambiguous. Marriage should vary directly with it. Variation
in "full wages" affects both implicit costs of time and full income and
therefore is ambiguous. Thus, full income, in sum, is ambiguous, and
Freiden chose a proxy for full income that enters his regressions as a
single variable.
In all his regressions, Freiden obtained a negative sign on his proxy for
full income and in many cases the t-statistics indicate that the results are
not solely due to a lack of richness in the data.
Returning to the Becker theory, male and female wages and nonlabor
income all enter the reduced-form relationship explaining marriage.
Variational effects of wage ratios and nonlabor earnings are clear;
variation in the wage sum (full earnings) is not. Nevertheless, all three
enter and have separate effects. Therefore, it seems that Freiden should
have introduced an additional explanatory variable, namely, the sum of
male-female wages. According to the theory, the relative-wage results
should hold up in the presence of full earnings. If Frieden's proxy for
full income is appropriate, its net effect, holduig full earnings constant,
should be positive. Given the generality of the theory that guided the
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empirical work, one cannot anticipate the sign on "full earnings" as
measured by the sum of the wages. Moreover, the data may not be rich
enough to yield significant results on relative wages, full earnings, and
full income. Thus, such results would be revealed by the data. It may also
be the case that 'less generality in the theory would further clarify the role
of full earnings in its relationship to marriage. For example, I investigated
a Cobb-Douglas production function with unit scale for the joint house-
hold.1
The main additional result gained by this specificity was the de-
lineation of the effect of a change in the sum of male and female wages
(full earnings), holding the wage ratio constant. For a Cobb-Douglas
household production function, an increase in full earnings due to
equiproportionate changes in the male and female wages reduces the
gain from the marriage whenever the ratio of full earnings to nonlabor
income is less than the ratio of labor cost to market-goods cost. Con-
versely, when the source of full income from labor relative to nonlabor
income is larger than the relative share of labor-to-goods cost in pro-
duction, an equal increase in both wage sources increases the attractiveness
of marriage, given the Becker framework. Whether this type of inference,
or something similar, holds for more general production functions and
whether data can be found to test more specific hypotheses about the role
of full earnings are open to question.
Not considering product allocation within the household contributes to
a failure to sort out variables into cost-returns (supply-demand) boxes
that have been found so useful in most work in economics. The impression
left in both the Freiden paper and the Gary Becker paper is that one
can say something about the incidence of marriage but, because of
symmetry, little can be said about such matters as the demand for wives
by males or the supply of wives. If one took the simple and obvious
expedient of assuming equal sharing of household production, the
demand for wives could be represented by the optimal joint-product
function less twice the single-male production, and the demand for
husbands by women could be similarly represented by joint production
minus twice the single-female production. These are the returns. On the
cost side there are costs of search, measured in some sense by the relevant
sex ratios, and costs of correcting mistakes, as reflected by ease of divorce.
Whether one could construct meaningful models that are identifiable in
this way, given the sorts of data which are available, is moot. If such
For goodreason,Becker wanted to avoid increasing returns to scale. Scale less than
or equal to unity leaves the burden of the theory to complementarity in production. As
Becker has pointed out, Cobb-Douglas (C-D) implies zero productivity in the singles
cases. Our sense of description may thus be offended by using the C-D function, but if we
accept the notion that marriage is more attractive, the larger the difference in joint and
individual household production, the general theory is not crucially violated by zero
product in the households of single individuals.
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constructions are possible, the link between model and data would be
clarified. As an example, in both the Freiden paper and that by Becker,
the sex ratio and the divorce-cost variables are brought in by ad hoc
argument rather than as an integral part of the theory. This makes for a
ceteris paribus problem in interpreting results. The equations that Freiden
fits with data are reduced forms of two sorts of considerations.
What follows are a few additional comments that may have marginal
value. (I) Certainly the existence of marriage predates progressive income
tax and joint returns. Nevertheless, levels of marriage incidence in modern
society should depend on tax structure. (2) Divorce costs probably vary
directly with the number of immature children; thus, the index used by
Freiden is not so appropriate for his higher-age groups. Divorce costs in
some states vary greatly, depending upon real assets. Also, lowering the
probability of dissolution of long-standing marriages is the effect of the
household equivalent of on-the-job training specific to the individual
household. One might expect considerable differences in the analysis of
survey data where one could obtain, for example, specific information
about household wealth, number of dependent children, or length of time
of current marriage. Survey data should also be amenable to resolution
of the importance of household productivity of the less intensive wage
earner. (3) The notion that the "likelihood" of marriage increases the
greater the difference in joint and individual household production is
appealing but somewhat lacking in rigor. The basic Becker theory is
completely deterministic. Therefore, in speaking of "likelihood," one
leaps from the basic theory into an area still to be explored. Whether
beginning with a probabilistic framework is of practical value is not clear,
but it should be recognized that there is here a methodological problem
which is not usually present in microeconomic modeling.
Lest the critical tone of these comments be misleading, itis worth
saying again that carrying economic analysis into unexplored terrain is
exciting and of potentially great value. The Becker theory and the Freiden
empirics are steps into a new area for economists. The steps are worthwhile
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